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Abstract. In January 1985, about 80 Muslim religious scholars
and biomedical scientists gathered in a symposium held in Kuwait
to discuss the broad question “When does human life begin?” This
article argues that this symposium is one of the milestones in the field
of contemporary Islamic bioethics and independent legal reasoning
(Ijtiha¯d ). The proceedings of the symposium, however, escaped the
attention of academic researchers. This article is meant to fill in this
research lacuna by analyzing the proceedings of this symposium, the
relevant subsequent developments, and finally the interplay of Islam
and the West as a significant dimension in these discussions.
Keywords: bioethics; biotechnology; ijtihad (study of Islamic
principles to derive legal opinions from the law); Islam; origin of
life; personhood; Qur’an, science; stem cells; theology and science
During the period January 15–17, 1985, the Islamic Organization for
Medical Sciences (IOMS) held a symposium in Kuwait with about
80 biomedical scientists and religious scholars participating. The topic
of the symposium was “Human Life: Its Beginning and Its End from an
Islamic Perspective.” This symposium is the second in a series of symposia
organized by the IOMS under the title “Islam and the Contemporary
MedicalConcerns.”The full proceedings of this symposiumwere published
in an approximately 700-page volume and divided into two parts: the
beginning of human life and the end of human life. This article focuses on
the first part where thirteen papers were presented (four by biomedical
scientists and nine by religious scholars) in addition to the detailed
discussions among the participants whose script was also included in the
published volume. The main question handled by these papers was “When
does human life begin?” This is in fact one of the fundamental questions
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in contemporary bioethics whose answer helps formulate standpoints on
different bioethical issues such as abortion, embryo research, and stem cell
research.
However, this specific question about the beginning of human life
from an Islamic perspective could attract the attention of just a few
contemporary academic researchers (Aksoy 2007, 89–90; Kurjak et al.
2007, 379; Sachedina 2009, 101–24). These few studies generally adopted
a normative approach by giving their own interpretations of a number of
scriptural texts relevant to the question about the beginning of human life,
which led them to different conclusions. For instance, the interpretation
of Aksoy takes the beginning of the eighth week after conception as the
starting point of human life, whereas Sachedina argues that human life
starts much earlier. As we shall see below, both interpretations were points
of extensive debate among the participants in the IOMS symposium. Still,
references to the proceedings of this symposium aremissing in these studies,
and if they ever appear, it is just as incidental references in the context of
discussing specific bioethical issues (Atighetchi 2007, 47, 95–96, 107, 123,
167, 176). A comprehensive analysis of this seminal symposium is, to my
knowledge, nonexistent. In order to place these discussions in their broad
context, first a note on Islamic independent legal reasoning (Ijtiha¯d ) and
its relevance to contemporary Islamic bioethics is due.
CONTEMPORARY ISLAMIC BIOETHICS AND THE INDEPENDENT
LEGAL REASONING (IJTIHA¯D)
It is generally acknowledged that bioethics in Islam is mainly a branch of
Islamic law and ethics and thus, contrary to the case in the Western world,
not (yet) an independent field of study. Hence, the main contributions
in this regard still come from Muslim religious scholars. Missing direct
references in the main sources of Islam, especially the Qur’a¯n (the Holy
Scripture of Muslims) and the Sunna (sayings, deeds, and approvals of the
Prophet of Islam), the main task of these scholars is to give “an independent
legal reasoning or interpretation,” known in the Islamic tradition as Ijtiha¯d
of what these sources would imply about different bioethical issues (Ghaly
2010, 8).
The proceedings of this symposium show that contemporary Muslim
religious scholars do not practice independent legal reasoning (Ijtiha¯d )
only when they encounter novel issues on which the main sources of
Islam are silent. As we shall see below, references to possible points for
determining the beginning of human life are available in both the Qur’a¯n
and the Sunna. Additionally, the bioethical questions relevant to this topic
have been extensively dealt with by classical Muslim religious scholars.
However, this did not hinder the participants in this symposium from
delving into the process of Ijtiha¯d . This had to do with different factors.
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First of all, the references in the Qur’a¯n and the Sunna are indecisive
concerning the exact starting point of human life and thus remain open
for different interpretations (Madhku¯r et al. 1985, 253; Ya¯s¯ın 1985, 87).
Second, the early Muslim religious scholars did not reach consensus about
determining the beginning of human life, and their opinions were based
not only on understanding the scriptural texts, but also on grasping the
scientific and medical information about embryology available in their
own time (Madhku¯r et al. 1985, 282, 303). Third, the recent scientific and
biomedical advancements challenge some of the interpretations advocated
by early Muslim religious scholars (Ba¯s.it. 1985, 110; Amma¯r¯ı 1985,
174). Thus, the scriptural texts should be reinterpreted and the opinions
of early religious scholars should be revised at the hand of the recent
scientific discoveries, especially in the field of embryology. H. assa¯n H. ath. u¯t
(1924–2009), one of the organizers of this symposium, said in this regard,
“Some of the points to be presented [in this symposium] are entirely novel,
and the early generations of Muslims did not see or write about them . . . .
The problems we discuss here require rational solutions in the first place
and textual quotations in the second place. Quoting [early sources] cannot
be a valid excuse to circumvent Ijtiha¯d” (H. ath. u¯t 1985, 55–56).
However, the organizers of this symposium had in mind specific
characteristics for the Ijtiha¯d they call for. First of all, Ijtiha¯d should be
seen as an ongoing process. The editorial of the published volume on this
symposium stated that Ijtiha¯d should be practiced not only once and for all
but on a regular basis so that the participants in this continuing process of
Ijtiha¯d can cope with the recurring magnificent advancements in the field
of medical sciences (Madhku¯r et al. 1985, 9). The second characteristic is
that Ijtiha¯d should be practiced collectively rather than individually. This
refers to what is known in Islamic law as al-Ijtiha¯d al-jama¯ı¯ (collective
Ijtiha¯d ), which became in vogue by the second half of the twentieth
century, and different institutions, starting by Egypt’s Islamic Research
Academy1 (Majma al-Buh. u¯th al-Isla¯miyya) in 1961 were established in
order to practice this type of Ijtiha¯d (Sa¯lu¯s 2008, 10). However, the
attention to bioethical issues remained incidental within these institutions,
and most of the efforts to tackle these issues remained individual rather
than collective. In his opening speech during this symposium, Dr. Abd
al-Rah.ma¯n Al-Awad. ı¯, the president of the IOMS, lamented the fact that
all viewpoints issued on this topic are exclusively based on individual
efforts that still miss the required scrutiny. Al-Awad. ı¯ added that no single
Islamic organization or authority has yet shown interest in adopting the
collective approach by holding symposiums where both scientists and
religious scholars participate (Madhku¯r et al. 1985, 19). In his paper on the
beginning of life, H. ath. u¯t justified the necessity of adopting this collective
approach by arguing that contemporary scientific discoveries became so
innovative and groundbreaking and also so full of ramifications that it
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became inevitable for both biomedical scientists and religious scholars
to collaborate together in order to handle the bioethical aspects of these
discoveries from an Islamic perspective (H. ath. u¯t 1985, 55).
On their side, the religious scholars who participated in this symposium
approved the suitability of the collective Ijtiha¯d for approaching such
complicated topics. A few days before holding this symposium, the
religious scholar Yu¯suf al-Qarad. a¯wı¯ wrote in his book on contemporary
Ijtiha¯d about this symposium and commended the idea of involving both
biomedical scientists and religious scholars in these bioethical discussions.
In the same book, al-Qarad. a¯wı¯ stated that scientific knowledge should be
seen as an essential component of the contemporary Ijtiha¯d , especially
in the field of bioethics (Qarad. a¯wı¯ 1994, 11, 29). In this symposium
al-Qarad. a¯wı¯ chaired the last session on determining the beginning of
human life. He inaugurated the session by underlying the necessity of
the collaboration between the two groups, namely scientists and religious
scholars. “A number of our early scholars couldmaster both Islamic law and
medicine such as Averroes. However, in our time it is uncommon or even
unattainable that someone would do this in this age where having minor
specialization is the norm,” al-Qarad. a¯wı¯ argued.He added that the religious
scholars urgently need the biomedical scientists in order to understand the
reality upon which they can draw their conclusions (Madhku¯r et al. 1985,
259). This vision of al-Qarad. a¯wı¯ was also shared by the other religious
scholars who participated in the symposium. The Tunisian Muh. ammad
Mukhta¯r al-Sala¯mı¯ also expressed his appreciation for the IOMS because
they promote the collective Ijtiha¯d and try to unify the efforts of both
scientists and religious scholars (Sala¯mı¯ 1985, 111).
Despite the agreement of all participants on the principle that it is
necessary and fruitful to discuss these issues together, there was a clear
disagreement about the limits of the scientists’ roles. Should their roles
be restricted to presenting the relevant scientific information? Or is it also
possible for them to draw conclusions about the beginning or end of human
life from an Islamic perspective? It was clear from the papers presented by
the biomedical scientists and the ensuing discussions during the symposium
that they aspired for an extended role and not a restricted one. That is
why most of them came up with their own vision about the beginning
of human life from a religious perspective and also presented their own
interpretations for the relevant scriptural texts. Some of the participating
religious scholars and also some scientists felt uneasy about this extended
role played by some scientists and opined that the role of each group should
be restricted to one’s own religious or scientific specialization (Madhku¯r
et al. 1985, 221, 260). In response, the Egyptian physician Is.a¯m al-Shirbı¯nı¯
(1928–2009) stressed that this should not be the case, at least during the
phase of deliberations and mutual discussions: “We believe that neither the
religious scholar nor the physician has the capacity to examine this issue
comprehensively without bilateral discussions between the two groups.
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Further, we are not just physicians. We are Muslim physicians, and the
Muslim physician has the right to fathom out the contentions and the
[juristic] rulings, to understand the scriptural evidence as far as he can,
and also to consult the religious scholar if he does not grasp the ruling”
(Madhku¯r et al. 1985, 64). The proceedings of this symposium showed
that the position advocated by al-Shiribı¯nı¯, in addition to other biomedical
scientists such asH. assa¯nH. ath. u¯t and the Egyptian physician whowas living
in the United States, Ah.mad al-Qa¯d. ı¯, (1940–2009) had the upper hand.
These scientists participated in the process of interpreting the relevant
scriptural texts and got into heated debates with the religious scholars
not only during the discussions but also in the stage of drafting the final
recommendations. For instance, during the final session of the symposium
held for discussing the final recommendations, Yu¯suf al-Al-Qarad. a¯wı¯ spoke
to the aforementioned H. assa¯n H. ath. u¯t and Ah.mad al-Qa¯d. ı¯ by saying, “I
kindly ask Prof. H. assa¯n and brother Dr. al-Qa¯d. ı¯ not to pressure us [namely
religious scholars] more than this. For three days now, they have been trying
to force their opinion.We have given some concessions, and now they have
to give concessions, too” (Madhku¯r et al. 1985, 659).
To conclude, the biomedical scientists in this symposium did not
function as just informants for the religious scholars about the required
scientific knowledge. They also participated in the Ijtiha¯d process as equal
partners and tried to give their opinion from a religious perspective. This
indicates an important development in Islamic thought where Ijtiha¯d was
usually seen as the exclusive right of the religious scholars or those who
master the Islamic religious sciences (Sa¯nu¯ 2006, 21–22).
WHEN DOES HUMAN LIFE BEGIN? A VARIETY OF ISLAMIC
PERSPECTIVES
The proceedings of this symposium show that there is a great variety
of opinions about the exact beginning of human life from an Islamic
perspective. Some of these opinions remained marginal during the
symposium and were completely ignored in the final recommendations
as well. For instance, the Egyptian dermatologist Ibra¯hı¯m al-S. ayya¯d
opined that the Prophet of Islam gave a definition for human life in
the tradition related around the incident of the cat when he was asked
by the Companions whether God would reward people for taking care
of animals. The response of the Prophet was that taking care of every
creature with humid liver (kabid ratba), and in another version of the
tradition warm liver (kabid h. arra¯), would be rewarded by God. Al-S. ayya¯d
argued that this tradition speaks about living creatures, and the sign of
being alive, as given by the Prophet, is having a humid and warm liver
with a functioning blood circulation system (Madhku¯r et al. 1985, 295).
None of the participants further commented either positively or negatively
on al-S. ayya¯d’s understanding of the tradition. Only Yu¯suf al-Al-Qarad. a¯wı¯
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gave two comments, none of which had to do with accepting or refusing
al-S. ayya¯d’s interpretation. The first comment was about the authenticity
of the tradition by saying that it is authentic. The second comment was
correcting the context of the tradition. Al-Qarad. a¯wı¯ said that the tradition
was related to the incident of the dog and not the cat (Madhku¯r et al.
1985, 297).
Beyond al-S. ayya¯d’s contention, the rest of the participants in this
symposium can be divided into two main positions advocating either
conception or the moment of soul-breathing as the determinant for the
beginning of human life. The advocates of each position had internal
disagreements about some minute details, which will be elaborated below.
The arguments used by each group were not only theological or religious
in nature. The participants gave considerable attention to biomedical,
scientific, and rational arguments as well.
THE FIRST POSITION: CONCEPTION IS THE STARTING POINT OF
HUMAN LIFE
The main thesis of this position is that human life starts by conception,
or in other words, when the ovum of the mother gets fertilized by the
sperm of the father. The main advocates of this position included different
physicians such asH. assa¯nH. ath. u¯t, Ah.mad al-Qa¯d. ı¯ and Abd al-H. a¯fiz. H. ilmı¯
besides a number of religious scholars, including Badr al-Mutawall¯ı Abd
al-Ba¯s.it., Muh. ammad Mukhta¯r al-Sala¯mı¯, Muh. ammad Abd al-Ha¯dı¯ Abu¯
Rı¯da, Ah.mad al-Ghandu¯r, and Abd al-Qa¯dir binMuh. ammad al-Amma¯r¯ı.
As noted earlier, the advocates of each position had some internally
nuanced differences. For instance, unlike H. ath. u¯t, who opined that human
life starts at the very moment of conception, Badr al-Mutawall¯ı Abd al-
Ba¯s.it. added to fertilization as criterion the phrase “and that it [the fertilized
ovum] has got settled in the womb (wa istiqra¯r dha¯lik fı¯ al-rah. im),” which
means that human life would start a bit later than what H. ath. u¯t contended
(H. ath. u¯t 1985, 59; Ba¯s.it. 1985, 109). The difference between the two
standpoints within this position got clear at the hand of the practical
question raised by a number of physicians about using an intrauterine
device (IUD) that is believed to restrain the already fertilized ovum from
being implanted in the wall of the uterus. Is using the IUD permissible
from the viewpoint of those who opined that human life starts at the
very moment of conception (Madhku¯r et al. 1985, 280–81, 290, 319)? In
response, the two main religious scholars supporting this posiiton, Shaykh
Abd al-Ba¯s.it. and Shaykh al-Sala¯mı¯, said that life should be protected once
the fertilized ovum gets settled in the womb and not before. Shaykh al-
Qarad. a¯wı¯, from the second position, interpreted their statement by saying
that they mean that life before the settlement of the fertilized ovum in
the uterus has no dignity and hence there is no harm if the IUD threw it
Mohammed Ghaly 181
away (Madhku¯r et al. 1985, 323–24). The zoologist Abd al-H. a¯fiz. H. ilmı¯
and the physician Ah.mad al-Qa¯d. ı¯ were first inclined to the viewpoint
advocated by Dr. H. ath. u¯t that stated that human life starts by the very
moment of conception. After the arguments and counterarguments on
this practical issue, they changed their mind and started to believe that
human life would start a couple of days after the process of fertilization
when the fertilized ova get settled in the womb (Madhku¯r et al. 1985, 305,
324). Dr. H. ath. u¯t remained, however, steadfastly advocating that human
life starts by conception. He said that the fertilized ovum takes about seven
days before it gets settled in the uterus. “Of course, I do not think that any
of us would say that the soul gets breathed on this seventh day!” H. ath. u¯t
argued. Thus, the IUD should be considered as a forbidden abortifacient
and not as a permissible contraceptive (Madhku¯r et al. 1985, 326–27).
Beyond this disagreement on the religious ruling concerning the IUD, the
arguments of the advocates of this position did not differentiate between
conception and implantation as a starting point for human life.
Before delving into the scientific arguments advanced by the advocates
of this position, an analytical remark about this position is due. One of
the main characteristics of this position is the general conviction that
biomedical and scientific knowledge should be given precedence over the
opinions expressed by classical Muslim religious scholars. Further, this
scientific knowledge should be the dominant factor when we choose one
of the possible interpretations for the scriptural texts. For instance, Dr.
H. ath. u¯t referred to the opinion within the H. anbal¯ı school of law that it
is permissible to get rid of the embryo before breathing the soul. Most
probably, H. ath. u¯t argued, they based this opinion on their belief that
the embryo before the soul-breathing stage is not living. In the light of
modernmedical knowledge, such an opinion cannot be accepted (Madhku¯r
et al. 1985, 303). The Tunisian religious scholar Mukhta¯r al-Sala¯mı¯ said
that this critical approach was also present among some classical Muslim
scholars who managed to master both medicine and Islamic law such as
al-Ra¯zı¯. Al-Ra¯zı¯ criticized a number of religious scholars from the Ma¯likı¯
school who opined that some of the newborn babies who die shortly after
delivery can be considered as nonliving even if they could have suckled
once or twice from their mothers’ breasts. Al-Ra¯zı¯ said that suckling, from
a scientific point of view, can never be done by a dead person (Madhku¯r
et al. 1985, 231). As for the interpretation of the scriptural texts, it was
clear that different advocates of this position were convinced that the
apparent meaning (al-z. a¯hir) of a scriptural text should be abandoned
as long as it contradicts scientific knowledge, and preference should be
given to the metaphorical interpretation (ta’wı¯l). The Kuwaiti religious
scholar Abd Alla¯h Muh. ammad Abd Alla¯h referred to the thirteenth-
century religious scholar Umar b. Muh. ammad al-Suna¯mı¯ who adopted
this approach. Al-Suna¯mı¯ made reference to the tradition of Ibn Masu¯d
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(see the Appendix), which implies that breathing the soul in the embryo
takes place after 120 days. Al-Suna¯mı¯ spoke about the opposition of his
contemporary physicians who argued that the purport of this Prophetic
tradition cannot be universally applied to every case of pregnancy. Their
opposition is based on medical practice whose denial, al-Suna¯mı¯ added,
is tantamount to denying facts. Al-Suna¯mı¯ tried to reconcile between the
text of the tradition and the medical knowledge of his time by saying
that the opening sentence in the tradition “The creation of one of you
(ah. adakum) is put together in his mother’s womb in 40 days” indicates
that its meaning is specific and not general. The grammatical structure “one
of you” (ah. adakum) does not necessarily mean everyone but possibly just
one specific person. This is also the case in other Qur’anic verses that used
the same structure in reference to a specific person and not to everyone
such as “Now send one of you (ah. adakum) with this money of yours to
the town” (18:19) (Abd Alla¯h 1985, 166–67). Further, we shall see below
how the proponents of this position exerted arduous efforts in order to
reconcile the Prophetic traditions on this issue, especially the tradition of
IbnMasu¯d (see the Appendix) with the purport of the scientific arguments
as outlined by Dr. H. ath. u¯t.
As for the scientific arguments advanced by the advocates of this
position,H. ath. u¯t argued that embryogenesis is an extremely gradual process
characterized by continuity and harmony, and thus there is no way to
pinpoint a specific moment and claim that here is the beginning of human
life. That is why, H. ath. u¯t added, the beginning of this life should be
counted from the earliest stage in which the following five conditions are
all applicable to a being: (1) the being has a clear and well-known start; (2)
he has the potential to grow as long as he has not been deprived of the causes
of growth; (3) his growth would result in a human being as fetus, neonate,
child, boy, young man, adult, old man, and so forth; (4) this being in
an earlier stage cannot grow to become a human being; and (5) the being
carries the full genetic code of the human race in general and of this being
in specific that distinguishes him from all others throughout the ages. To
H. ath. u¯t, all these conditions are only applicable to the fertilized ovum and
thus not to any of the stages before or after conception (H. ath. u¯t 1985,
58–59). In reference to the other position, which takes the moment of
soul-breathing as the beginning of human life, H. ath. u¯t said that breathing
the soul is from the perspective of medical sciences a purely metaphysical
concept that belongs to the ghaybiyya¯t (matters of the unseen world) and
thus cannot be examined. Hence, any bid to claim a link between this
religious concept and specific neurobehavioral developments that can be
observed by science, H. ath. u¯t argued, is unfortunately a matter of folklore
rather than a scientifically grounded argumentation. H. ath. u¯t also expressed
his dissatisfaction with calling life prior to the moment of soul-breathing
as vegetative or animal life in contrast to human life that would then start
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after the soul-breathing. He said that human life cannot be compared to
that of plants that, unlike human beings, have neither active motor systems
nor nervous systems. Additionally, plants nourish themselves with light,
absorb carbon dioxide, and discharge oxygen. As for comparing human
life to animal life, H. ath. u¯t said that the Darwinists might be happy when
we state that one of the stages of human embryo is an animal life, but
we would not say that (H. ath. u¯t 1985, 57). Dr. Ah.mad al-Qa¯d. ı¯ added that
the fertilized ovum would never develop into an animal but just a human
being (Madhku¯r et al. 1985, 206).
Concerning the religious arguments, the advocates of this position made
use of different Qur’anic verses, Prophetic traditions, practical rulings
in Islamic law, and the opinions adopted by early authoritative Muslim
religious scholars.
One of the Qur’anic verses quoted to support this position is “Verily
We created Man (insa¯n) from a drop (nut. fa) of mingled sperm” (76:02).
So, the Qur’a¯n used the term insa¯n (man or human being) to speak about
the nut. fa, which is the earliest stage in pregnancy as outlined in different
Qur’anic verses (Madhku¯r et al. 1985, 218). The other verse reads “And
when you are embryos (ajinna) in the wombs of your mothers” (53:32).
Dr. H. ath. u¯t wondered, who are “you” in this verse? It is you and me; the
human being, he replied. He wants to conclude that the Qur’a¯n speaks
about human life even in the stage of the embryo (Madhku¯r et al. 1985,
303).
As for the Prophetic traditions, the advocates of this position gave
comments on the two traditions, which were central in the discussions
(see the Appendix). Both traditions speak about an angel whom God
entrusts with specific tasks concerning the future of the embryo such as
determining the sex and age and breathing the soul. The advocates of this
position argued that the texts of these two traditions cannot be taken at
face value in order to claim that human life starts after 40 or 120 days
of pregnancy. Beyond breathing the soul, which cannot be examined on
scientific grounds, modern science shows that other tasks mentioned in
these traditions cannot be executed on any of these two dates. For instance,
the sex of the to-be-born baby gets determined by the moment of the
union between the male sperm and the female ovum and thus not after 40
or 120 days of pregnancy but much earlier. Therefore, the text should be
metaphorically interpreted so that it will not contradict science. H. ath. u¯t’s
proposed interpretation was that the angel on that day (40 or 120) does not
determine the sex of the to-be-born, but just asks God to know from Him
what had already been destined in this respect (H. ath. u¯t 1985, 58; Madhku¯r
et al. 1985, 298). As for the three stages mentioned in the tradition of Ibn
Masu¯d (see the Appendix) and that each of which would take 40 days,
Muh. ammad Abd al-Ha¯dı¯ Abu¯ Rı¯da (1909–1990), the late professor of
Islamic philosophy, said that metaphorical interpretation (ta’wı¯l) should
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be used. Each of these stages should be understood just as a stage in the
process of embryonic development and not that alaqa or nut. fa lasts for
40 days. That is because adopting the literal interpretation in this regard
would collide with the medical reality (Madhku¯r et al. 1985, 225–26).
As for breathing the soul specifically, the argument was that the soul-
breathing is just an incident that takes place within the life of the embryo
and does not necessarily mark the beginning of human life (H. ath. u¯t 1985,
57–58). The Yemeni religious scholar Abd al-Qa¯dir bin Muh. ammad al-
Amma¯r¯ı said that this interpretation is not necessarily contradictory to the
tradition of Ibn Masu¯d, which, at first sight, indicates that there are three
consecutive stages in the pregnancy, each of which takes 40 days, and after
this the soul gets breathed by the angel. The text of the tradition divides
between each stage with the conjunction “then,” in Arabic thumma, which
is usually seen as a coordinating conjunction and thus implies that these
stages are chronologically ordered. This is one of the grammatical functions
of “then” (thumma) in the Arabic language, but it is not necessarily its only
function, al-Amma¯r¯ı argued. For instance, this conjunction can sometimes
be used as a synonym for the conjunction “and” in Arabic “wa” and in
this case does not imply any chronological order. Al-Amma¯r¯ı argued that
“then” (thumma) in the tradition of Ibn Masu¯d can be best interpreted
as “and” (wa). For instance, when reviewing the same stages mentioned in
the tradition of Ibn Masu¯d, the Qur’a¯n sometimes uses the conjunction
“then” (thumma) (22:05) and sometimes another conjunction, namely
fa (also usually translated in English as “and”) (23:13). This means that
“then” (thumma) is not meant here to convey a specific chronological
order. According to this reading, there can be an overlap between the stages
mentioned in the Prophetic traditions and that these stages including
breathing the soul can be repeated three times, each time continues for
40 days. In this way, the tradition of Ibn Masu¯d can also be reconciled
with the other relevant Prophetic traditions, especially the tradition of
H. udhayfa (see the Appendix) (Amma¯r¯ı 1985, 172–73). Dr. al-Shirbı¯nı¯
was not satisfiedwith al-Amma¯r¯ı’s interpretation of the conjunction “then”
(thumma). He said that it is true that sometimes this conjunction does not
imply a chronological order between two incidents. However, this is not
applicable to a sentence which, starts with the verb “start/begin” and the
conjunction “then” (thumma) comes afterward. This is exactly the case of
the Qur’anic verses that spoke about the creation of the human being, “He
began the creation of man with clay. Then (thumma) He made his progeny
from a draught of despised fluid. Then (thumma) He fashioned him in due
proportion and breathed into him of His Spirit” (32:07–09) (Madhku¯r
et al. 1985, 203).
The advocates of this position were sometimes accused of being
influenced by the materialists who denies the existence of the soul at all.
That is because they do not give any special consideration to the incident
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of the soul-breathing as a crucial point in the gestational development. For
instance, the Jordanian religious scholar Muh. ammad Na¯ım Yas¯ın, who is
an advocate of the second position, argued that calling life before breathing
the soul an animal life would not make Darwin happy. What would make
Darwin happy is to set the soul aside and make it a metaphysical concept
with no touchable influence in human life (Madhku¯r et al. 1985, 222).
In response, al-Qa¯d. ı¯ said that the proponents of this position stress that
human life starts by the moment of conception not because they do not
give special consideration to the soul. On the contrary, al-Qa¯d. ı¯ added, they
adopted this opinion in order to save this human being, including his soul,
which would seem less valuable if we said that human life starts on a later
date (Madhku¯r et al. 1985, 269, 288).
One of the arguments advanced by the proponents of this position
is the list of practical rulings in Islamic law, which kept pregnancy into
consideration without differentiating between the period before or after
breathing the soul. For instance, if a pregnant woman was sentenced to
death, the death penalty should be postponed until she delivers her baby.
The fact that this postponement should take place anyhow whether this
pregnancy is still in the beginning or in its final stage means that Islamic
law sees that there is life that should be respected. Otherwise, why would
the death penalty be postponed then (H. ath. u¯t 1985, 59–60; Ba¯s.it. 1985,
109; Sala¯mı¯ 1985, 115–21; Madhku¯r et al. 1985, 219–20, 303)?
The advocates of this position also stressed that their opinion, although
based on modern science, is not an innovation within Islamic law and that
early Muslim jurists advocated this opinion. The main classical scholar
quoted by the advocates of this position is the well-known Muslim jurist,
theologian, and mystic Abu¯ H. a¯mid al-Ghaza¯l¯ı (d. 111). According to
this position, al-Ghaza¯l¯ı also opined that life should be respected from
the beginning of pregnancy and thus any offence against this life should
be punishable from an Islamic perspective. The Ma¯likı¯ school of law also
opined that the existence of life, which should be respected from a religious
perspective, starts from the date of fertilization and any offence against this
being is prohibited. As for the contention of other classical religious scholars
that the fertilized ovum can be damaged before the stage of soul-breathing,
the advocates of this position argued that such an opinion is not valid
anymore now. These classical scholars based their contention on the belief
that a fertilized ovum before breathing the soul can be just congealed blood.
However, with the help of available scientific tools, we can be sure if there is
pregnancy or not. Further, it is scientifically proven that there is life before
the moment of breathing the soul, and thus it is clear that the soul does not
get breathed into a dead fetus (H. ath. u¯t 1985, 59; Ba¯s.it. 1985, 110; Sala¯mı¯
1985, 119).
The slippery slope argument was also advanced by the advocates of
this position. In Islamic law, the legal term of this argument is sadd
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al-dhara¯’i, which literally means “blocking the means” and as a technical
term indicates “blocking the means to evil” (Kamali 2003, 397). Different
voices within this tradition warned that determining the beginning of
human life by a date later than the moment of conception, different evils
would ensue. For instance, people would be very lax about perpetrating
abortion before the date seen to mark the beginning of human life. Dr.
al-Qa¯d. ı¯ spoke about his own experience in the United States where more
than one million abortions are reported on an annual basis, and many
of these abortions take place even after 40 or 120 days. He added that
this is exactly what would happen if we ratified, for instance, the opinion
stating that human life starts after 40 days. That is because women usually
make mistakes about determining the date of the last menstrual period
from which the gestational age gets calculated (Madhku¯r et al. 1985, 298).
The Tunisian religious scholar Muh. ammad Mukhta¯r al-Sala¯mı¯ referred
to another possible evil, namely promoting birth control in the third
world countries. Terminating pregnancy on purpose by means of medical
intervention, al-Sala¯mı¯ argued, is prohibited from an Islamic perspective
unless the pregnancy would jeopardize the mother’s life or the embryo
gets deformed. Astonishingly enough, al-Sala¯mı¯ wondered, the Western
countries are eagerly interested in controlling the birth rates in the third
world instead of thinking, for instance, of exploiting the natural resources.
Al-Sala¯mı¯ appended his paper presented to the symposium with the text
of an article published by the French newspaper Le Mond in December
1984. The article spoke about developing abortifacient known as RU-
486 (later known as mifepristone) that can terminate pregnancy without
surgical operation even after 7 weeks of pregnancy. The article added that
the researchers argued that this abortifacient would be the optimum way
for women in the third world countries to do birth control because it does
not necessitate the availability of advanced medical infrastructure (Sala¯mı¯
1985, 121–22; Madhku¯r et al. 1985, 287–88, 302).
THE SECOND POSITION: BREATHING THE SOUL IS THE STARTING
POINT OF HUMAN LIFE
The main thesis of this position is that human life starts by breathing
the soul, which happens later than the moment of conception. This
position was advocated by different religious scholars, including Yu¯suf
al-Al-Qarad. a¯wı¯, Muh. ammad Na¯ım Yas¯ın, Muh. ammad Fawzı¯ Fayd. Alla¯h,
Mus.t.afa¯ S. abr¯ı Ardughdu¯, S. a¯lih. Mu¯sa¯ Sharaf, Abd al-Rah.ma¯n Abd al-
Kha¯liq, and Abd Alla¯h al--Isa¯, in addition to a number physicians,
including Is.a¯m al-Shiribı¯nı¯, Ah.mad Shawqı¯ Ibra¯hı¯m, and Abd Alla¯h
Ba¯sala¯ma.
Despite their agreement on recognizing the soul-breathing as the starting
point of human life, the advocates of this position disagreed on how to
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measure this stage from a scientific point of view and also on the supposed
date on which the soul-breathing takes place.
This position also made use of different arguments, some of which
were scientific in nature, whereas the other arguments had to do with
religious aspects such as Qur’anic verses, Prophetic traditions, and early
authorities in Islamic law. Before delving into the details of these arguments,
an analytical remark is due about the main methodological differences
between this position and the previous one concerning the position and
the value of medical and scientific knowledge when dealing with scriptural
texts.
The first position believed that all relevant scriptural texts are in principle
open for different interpretations and none of these interpretations is
definitive (qat. ı¯). So they had no problem to apply the tools ofmetaphorical
interpretation (ta’wı¯l) as long as this will lead to a conclusion that is
compatible with medical and scientific knowledge. This approach did not
appeal to some of the advocates of the second position. The strongest
opposition came from the Kuwaiti religious scholar Abd al-Rah.ma¯n Abd
al-Kha¯liq, who accused the first position and its advocates, including Dr.
H. ath. u¯t, of trying to cross out the Qur’anic verses and the Prophetic
traditions from the discussions and claim that these texts are something
metaphysical that cannot be examined by science. He argued further
that the relevant scriptural texts on this issue are definitive and they are
not open for different interpretations. For instance, when the Prophet
says that the fluid-drop (nut.fa) stage continues for 40 days, we cannot
interpret this text metaphorically and say that this means thirty-nine. Such
a metaphorical interpretation is not a religious paradox, but a religious
sin (Madhku¯r et al. 1985, 241–43). Further, even if the text is open for
different interpretations, then recourse should be made to the apparent
meaning (z. a¯hir) of the text, and available scientific knowledge does not
justify applying the tools of metaphorical interpretation. This scientific
knowledge, especially the recently developed science of embryology, is
speculative (z. annı¯) and undergoes recurrent revisions and amendments
every now and then, whereas the Qur’anic verses and the Prophetic
traditions are firmly established and cannot change anymore (Ibra¯hı¯m
1985, 204; Madhku¯r et al. 1985, 242, 272–73). That is why, Dr.
Ah.mad Shawqı¯ Ibra¯hı¯m argued, whenever a scientific opinion or discovery
challenges the Qur’a¯n or the Sunna, then it means that this opinion is
wrong and one day people will find this out (Ibra¯hı¯m 1985, 204). On his
side, Dr. H. ath. u¯t from the other position was unhappy with this criticism
and said that none of the participants in this symposiumwould have doubts
about this fact. To him, the main issue is not to compare between science
and religion to see which one would give more certainty. The main issue
is that there are scriptural texts that are open for different interpretations,
and science might sustain one of these interpretations. Why should we
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confine ourselves to one specific interpretation as long as there are other
alternatives, H. ath. u¯t wondered (Madhku¯r et al. 1985, 254–55).
As for the scientific arguments, the proponents of this position opined
that the incident of breathing the soul can be detected now by means of
reliable scientific tools. The Egyptian neurologist Mukhta¯r al-Mahdı¯ said
that determining the beginning of human life was a mission impossible in
early times because breathing the soul was a metaphysical issue with no
scientific equivalent. This situation has drastically changed, especially in
the last years where the different embryonic developments can be followed
and in some cases even controlled and manipulated. Thanks to these
modern scientific advancements, a specific embryonic development can
now be pinpointed and state that it is an indication of breathing the soul
and thus the beginning of human life (Mahdı¯ 1985, 64–65). With the
exception of the aforementioned opinion expressed by Ibra¯hı¯m al-S. ayya¯d
that functioning liver and active blood circulation mark the soul-breathing
stage, the physicians who supported this position opined that development
of the nervous system and especially the brain is the scientific sign that
ushers the soul-breathing stage (Mahdı¯ 1985, 67–69; Ibra¯hı¯m 1985, 75;
Ba¯sala¯ma 1985, 79, 81).
As for the five conditions outlined by H. ath. u¯t, whose fulfillment by the
moment of conception would indicate the beginning of human life, the
advocates of this position raised questions about the validity of the third
condition, namely the fertilized ovum would result in a human being.
They said that it is not necessary that the union of a male sperm and a
female ovum would finally produce a human being. Sometimes this union
results in molar pregnancy, which is in fact clusters of cells that have life
and has also the capacity to proliferate inside the uterus. The life of these
cells endangers the mother’s life and thus must be disposed of in order to
rescue the life of the mother (Ba¯sala¯ma 1985, 77; Madhku¯r et al. 1985,
215). Shaykh al-Sala¯mı¯ replied to this argument by saying that rulings in
Islamic law can be based on rules that are not applicable to every relevant
single case but just to the majority of them. At the end every rule should
have its own exceptions, al-Sala¯mı¯ concluded (Madhku¯r et al. 1985, 302).
Dr. Mukhta¯r al-Mahdı¯ raised another question about the applicability of
these conditions to the case of twins. In this case, the fertilized ovum
splits into a number of cells, each of which produces a distinct embryo, so
when did the human life of this twin start? Was this when the ovum got
fertilized or when the ovum split into cells? (Mahdı¯ 1985, 63). In response
to al-Mahdı¯’s question, Dr. H. ath. u¯t said that this question is based on
perceiving life as something material and divisible, so when the fertilized
ovum splits into twins, it means that each of the two would have half
of the life of the fertilized ovum. The entity of life is unknown, H. ath. u¯t
argued, and thus cannot be approached through our common materialistic
notions. ToH. ath. u¯t, religion can also help understanding the phenomenon
of twins. One would then say the ovum destined by God to produce
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twins was originally provided with two lives (H. ath. u¯t 1985, 60). Instead of
these five conditions that looked controversial from the perspective of this
position, Dr. al-Mahdı¯ spoke about five embryonic developments taking
place during the twelfth week of pregnancy that all indicate the emergence
of a distinct human being, namely (1) the movements of the fetus start
to become complex and harmonious rather than being hectic, (2) the
emergence of breathing-like movements that are not meant for obtaining
oxygen because the lungs do not work anyhow during pregnancy. However,
these movements are strong indicators that the brainstem started to work
because respiratory control is one of its functions, (3) the fetus experiences
consequent and regular activity-rest rhythms where periods of locomotor
activity get usually followed by periods of rest and sleep, (4) some research
papers showed that electrical signals produced by the fetal brain emerge
in the twelfth week and can also be measured. These signals indicate that
both the cerebral cortex and the cerebral hemispheres started to work, and
(5) the onset of fetal movements, which do not have a sudden, jerky, or
spastic quality and thus convey new significance. These newmovements are
responses to exterior alerts such as these of the Doppler ultrasound while
moving on the belly of the pregnant woman. This means that specific brain
centers have caused these movements and started to make the fetus aware
of anything abnormal that might happen around him and thus be able
to distinguish these abnormal exterior alerts from the normal sounds and
movements such as the mother’s heartbeat. Al-Mahdı¯ added that these new
developments that take place in the twelfth week and that also coincide
with the fact that the brain gets fully shaped and starts to function represent
a turning point in the fetal development (Mahdı¯ 1985, 68–69). On his
side, the Saudi gynecologist Abd Alla¯h H. usayn Ba¯sala¯ma stressed that the
existence of a fully developed and sound brain is an essential condition
to state that the fetus has a human life, especially bearing in mind that
some religious scholars said that the place of the soul is the brain (Ba¯sala¯ma
1985, 81; Madhku¯r et al. 1985, 215). From the other camp, Dr. H. ath. u¯t
objected to associating the beginning of human life with the functionality
of the nervous system and found this very unconvincing. First of all,
H. ath. u¯t argued, the existence of the nervous system precedes the moment
of soul-breathing and does not get fully developed even by the moment of
birth. Additionally, the newborn calf can run directly, whereas the newborn
human being cannot do this for a long time (H. ath. u¯t 1985, 58). Dr. al-
Qa¯d. ı¯ also objected to using the full development of the brain as a marker
for the beginning of human life. “We know that the function of the brain
does not come to perfection either in the fourth month or even in the
ninth month of the fetal age,” al-Qa¯d. ı¯ argued (Madhku¯r et al. 1985,
209). In response, Dr. al-Mahdı¯ said that his criterion for determining the
beginning of human life—namely, the brain gets fully shaped—is a new
scientific point of view and that “brain gets fully shaped” does not mean
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literally the maturation of the brain but just that it starts functioning in
the twelfth week of pregnancy (Madhku¯r et al. 1985, 210).
The physicians advocating this position also made use of a well-known
rule in Islamic jurisprudence known as qiya¯s (analogical reasoning) but
they applied it to science rather than to religion. As a legal term in Islamic
law, qiya¯smeans the extension of a religious ruling (h. ukm) from an original
case (as.l), which is regulated by a scriptural text, to a new case (far) because
the latter has the same effective cause (illa) as the former (Kamali 2003,
264). The original case here is that brain death marks the end of human
life. The new case in this regard is that the birth of the brain marks the
beginning of human life. The advocates of this position argued that as long
as there is no disagreement among scientists about the original case, then
the new case should also be accepted by means of analogy because of the
commonality of the effective cause, namely, the central role of brain in
determining the nature of human life (Ba¯sala¯ma 1985, 81; Mahdı¯ 1985,
69). Dr. al-Qa¯d. ı¯ did not agree with applying qiya¯s in this regard and argued
that there is a discrepancy between the two cases. After brain death, the
life of some cells can be sustained with the help of nutrition and medical
care, but they will not constitute a human being in the future. This is not
the case with the fertilized ovum that will result in a human being as long
as it receives the due nutrition and care even if it was taken away from
the body of the pregnant woman and got implanted in another woman’s
uterus (Madhku¯r et al. 1985, 207). Dr. al-Mahdı¯ commented very briefly
on al-Qa¯d. ı¯’s criticism by saying that he did not mean comparing cells but
tissues (Madhku¯r et al. 1985, 210).
The advocates of this position tried to reconcile the scientific vision,
which ensures the existence of different symptoms of life before breathing
the soul with the traditional religious view that makes breathing the soul
as the marker of the beginning of human life. They opined that there
is life prior to breathing the soul but not yet a human life. They gave
different labels to life in this early stage of pregnancy such as vegetative,
animal, cellular, and organic life (Mahdı¯ 1985, 63; Ibra¯hı¯m 1985, 74–75;
Ya¯s¯ın 1985, 96). In this respect, the Egyptian surgeon Ah.mad Shawqı¯
Ibra¯hı¯m commented on H. ath. u¯t’s objection that naming life before the
soul-breathing an animal life implies that the embryo goes through an
animal-like stage and thus partially agrees with the Darwinists. Dr. Ibra¯hı¯m
said that naming life in this stage an animal life does not mean that we
believe that the embryonic cell in this stage is a cell of an animal. Ibra¯hı¯m
also said that the Darwinists are not completely wrong because there is
a certain degree of evolution in the creation as indicated by different
references in the Qur’a¯n and the Sunna. However, these references support
the idea that each species undergoes evolution separately, but not that all
species descends from a common ancestor (Madhku¯r et al. 1985, 204).
The sharp disagreements among the scientists participating in this
symposium on almost every point were disappointing for different
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religious scholars. For instance, the Yemeni religious scholar Abd al-Qa¯dir
al-Amma¯r¯ı said that physicians should be blamed for disagreeing with each
other because, unlike the religious scholars, they have plenty of medical and
scientific tools to settle these disagreements (Madhku¯r et al. 1985, 221).
The same holds true for the ex-Minister of Religious Affairs in Egypt,
Ibra¯hı¯m al-Dasu¯qı¯, who got confused because of these disagreements
(Madhku¯r et al. 1985, 225, 250), and the Jordanian religious scholar
Muh. ammad Na¯ım Yas¯ın, who could not find clear answers from the
physicians about when the formation of the brain starts and when it comes
to completion (Madhku¯r et al. 1985, 223). Consequently, the general
impression especially among the advocates of this position, including even
a number of physicians, is that biomedical knowledge cannot give a decisive
answer to the question “When does human life begin?” The answer should
instead be sought after in the scriptural texts (Madhku¯r et al. 1985, 202,
204, 217, 221).
Different Qur’anic verses (15:29; 22:05; 32:09; 38:72) were quoted
by the advocates of this position as supporting arguments. The following
verses were central: “Man We did create from a quintessence of clay. Then
We placed him as a fluid-drop (nut. fa) in a place of rest, firmly fixed. Then
We made the fluid-drop into a clot of congealed blood (alaqa); then of
that clot We made a little lump (mud. gha); then we made out of that little
lump bones and clothed the bones with flesh; then we developed out of it
another creature. So blessed be Allah, the best to create!” (23: 12–14). On
the basis of these verses, Dr. Ba¯sala¯ma contended that the fertilized ovum
passes by three stages: (1) the cellular stage during which the fertilized
ovum of a human being can hardly be distinguished from what we can
find inside the uteruses of some animals, (2) the alaqa and mud. gha stage
when one can observe a human-like being, and (3) the soul-breathing stage
that takes place when the nervous system, including the brain, gets fully
shaped and the verse expressed this stage by saying, “Then we developed
out of it another creature” (Ba¯sala¯ma 1985, 78–79). The religious scholars
preferred to consider alaqa andmud. gha as two distinct stages and thus the
total will be four (Ashqar, Umar 1985, 138; Sharaf 1985, 185–86). It is
clear that the above-mentioned verses gave no indication either about the
duration of these stages or about the moment of breathing the soul. These
details are given by different Prophetic traditions, especially the tradition
of Ibn Masu¯d (see the Appendix) in which it is stated that the nut. fa stage
lasts for 40 days and the same period is also allocated for each of the
alaqa and the mud. gha stages. The tradition added that the angel breathes
the soul into the fetus after the lapse of these three stages—that is, after
120 days.
The advocates of this position focused on two main points that can
be concluded from the Qur’anic verses and the Prophetic traditions,
namely associating the soul-breathing with the beginning of human life
and the exact timing of breathing the soul. Concerning the first point, the
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advocates of the first position raised doubts about the plausibility of this
association and said that the term “soul” (ru¯h. ) is very elastic in the Islamic
literature, and different interpretations have been given to this term, so
why should breathing the soul in this specific context be interpreted as the
beginning of human life (Madhku¯r et al. 1985, 208, 255)? However, the
advocates of the second position unanimously agreed that breathing the
soul, as implied from the Qur’anic verses and as explicitly stated in the
tradition of Ibn Masu¯d, should be taken as the marker of the beginning
of human life and not as just an incident that takes place during the
life of the embryo. To them, this is how the majority of classical Muslim
scholars, including al-Qurt.ubı¯ (d. 1272), Ibn al-Qayyim (d. 1350), and Ibn
H. ajar (d. 1449), interpreted this tradition. Further, the religious scholars
unanimously agreed that death takes place when the soul leaves the body
(Ya¯s¯ın 1985, 93–95). The Jordanian religious scholar Umar al-Ashqar
argued further that life as a Qur’anic term means exclusively breathing the
soul, and thus the period before this stage can simply be called death and
the embryo before breathing the soul, from a Qur’anic perspective, is dead.
The Qur’anic verses (02:28; 40:11) speak about two deaths and two lives
that a human being undergoes. After pondering the text of these verses and
the interpretations of the Qur’a¯n commentators, al-Ashqar came to the
conclusion that the first death is the embryo before the stage of breathing
the soul, the first life is breathing the soul in the embryo, the second death
happens when the soul leaves the body, and the second life is the return of
the soul to the body in the Hereafter after resurrection. This conclusion
also goes in line with the opinion of the Companion Ibn Masu¯d and the
authoritative Qur’a¯n commentator Qata¯da (d. 735) (Ashqar, Umar 1985,
134–35).
As for the exact timing of breathing the soul, advocates of this position
agreed that it cannot be equated with the date of conception but it would
take place on a later date. Further, they formulated three different opinions
about the exact date of breathing the soul. The neurologist Mukhta¯r al-
Mahdı¯ tried to reconcile the tradition of Ibn Masu¯d (see the Appendix)
with the aforementioned embryonic developments, which show that the
development of the brain and the nervous system undergoes a turning point
in the twelfth week of pregnancy. To him the three stages mentioned in the
tradition of IbnMasu¯d should not be taken as three distinct and successive
stages, each of which continues for 40 days. He argued that the tradition of
IbnMasu¯d was also reported byMuslim but with a little addition, namely,
instead of “then he becomes a clot of congealed blood (alaqa) for a similar
period” according to the text reported by al-Bukha¯r¯ı, the text of Muslim
reads, “then he becomes in this a clot of congealed blood (alaqa) for a
similar period.” “In this” here means that alaqa stage starts during, and
not after the end of, the nut. fa stage, and the same holds true for themud. gha
stage that would also start during, and not after the end of, the alaqa stage.
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So, we have here three overlapping and not three distinct forties and thus
the total should not be 120 days but less than this. Bearing in mind that
the fetus witnesses an important turning point in the twelfth week, then
the total of the three overlapping forties should be calculated as 84 days,
and this is the date of breathing the soul (Mahdı¯ 1985, 70–71). Al-Mahdı¯’s
conclusion did not gain further any support either from the religious
scholars who see that it deviates from the traditional viewpoints in Islamic
law or from the participating scientists. The second opinion was advocated
by the Jordanian religious scholarMuh. ammad Sulayma¯n al-Ashqar.He had
some critical remarks about the tradition of IbnMasu¯d (see the Appendix).
For instance, the tradition of Ibn Masu¯d has been reported with different
variations, and only one of these variations states that the soul gets breathed
after 120 days. The other variations did not make any reference to the soul
breathing. Second, only one of these variations mentioned three forties,
whereas the other variations mentioned forty nights, forty-two, forty-five,
or just an approximate estimation between forty-three and forty-nine.
Thus, al-Ashqar argued, breathing the soul should not be estimated later
than 40 days except for a few days in order to be on the safe side in
such a critical issue upon which a lot of practical rulings in Islamic law
are based (Ashqar, Muh. ammad 1985 126–27). The third opinion, which
was supported by the majority, is that the angel breathes the soul into
the fetus after 120 days. The main argument for this opinion was the
tradition of Ibn Masu¯d (see the Appendix), which was considered by the
advocates of this opinion as the backbone of their argumentation. To them,
the tradition should be read without metaphorical interpretation (ta’wı¯l)
because the text is clear enough; three stages each of which continues for
40 days and after the lapse of these three forties, the angel breathes the soul
into the fetus (Ya¯s¯ın 1985, 91; Ibra¯hı¯m 1985, 75; Ba¯sala¯ma 1985, 80–81;
Ardughdu¯ 1985, 192; Madhku¯r et al. 1985, 202–03). As for the other
variations of the tradition of IbnMasu¯d and the other Prophetic traditions,
ShaykhMuh. ammad Yas¯ın stated first of all that early authoritative Muslim
scholars opined that the tradition of IbnMasu¯d, as reported by al-Bukha¯r¯ı,
is the most authentic one and any other contradictory traditions should
be metaphorically interpreted in order to fit within its apparent meaning
(z. a¯hir al-nas.s.). Second, all authentic traditions and their variations agree
that the angel does not visit the embryo before 40 days, and this means
that breathing the soul cannot be before the lapse of the 40 days anyhow.
So, theoretically speaking there are just two options, namely the angel
breathes the soul directly after the lapse of the 40 days or on a later
date. The tradition of Ibn Masu¯d crossed out the first option, and this
is the fact, Yas¯ın argued further, upon which neither the scriptural texts
nor the Muslim religious scholars disagreed (Ya¯s¯ın 1985, 98–99). As for
the tradition of H. udhayfa (see the Appendix) that mentioned that the
angel’s visit takes place by the fortieth or the forty-fifth night of gestation,
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Dr. Ah.mad Shawqı¯ Ibra¯hı¯m said that this tradition made no reference to
breathing the soul, which means that the angel is entrusted with doing
something else but not breathing the soul (Ibra¯hı¯m 1985, 75; Madhku¯r et
al. 1985, 249).
In response to the advocates of the first position who stated that their
opinion is supported by early authoritative religious scholars such as Abu¯
H. a¯mid al-Ghaza¯l¯ı (d. 111), the supporters of this position argued that the
majority of the early religious scholars support their opinion and not that
of the first position. First of all the opinion of al-Ghaza¯l¯ı is contrary to the
opinion adopted by the Sha¯f¯ı¯ı school to which al-Ghaza¯l¯ı himself belongs.
Further, the H. anbal¯ı school of law also stated that it is allowed to get rid
of the embryo before the lapse of 40 days. Different voices in the H. anaf¯ı
school of law also opined that getting rid of the embryo before breathing
the soul is allowed and the soul gets breathed after 120 days. The only
approved standpoint within the Ma¯likı¯ school of law is that the embryo
cannot be aborted even before 40 days. However, someMa¯likı¯ scholars still
opined that it is allowed (Ashqar 1985 127–28).
The advocates of this position also responded to the argument that
many of the practical rulings in Islamic law are based on considering the
fact that there is pregnancy whether this pregnancy passed the stage of soul-
breathing or not yet. Shaykh Muh. ammad Yas¯ın said although this holds
true for many of the practical rulings in Islamic law, some of these rulings
did differentiate before and after the soul-breathing stage, such as abortion.
For instance, Some Muslim religious scholars opined that it is permitted
before breathing the soul, but they all agreed that it is prohibited thereafter.
However, a careful examination of all practical rulings that kept pregnancy
before the lapse of four months into consideration shows that the rationale
of these rulings is not the beginning of human life in its accurate sense
as conveyed by the above-mentioned Prophetic traditions but something
else. For instance, those who prohibited abortion from the very moment of
conception have rationalized this prohibition by saying that the fertilized
ovum is the original seed from which the human being will be created later
and thus it has a sort of dignity that should be respected. On the basis
of the same rationale some religious scholars also prohibited wasting the
sperm even before fertilization and prohibited even taking any medicine
that would spoil the capacity of being pregnant. As for associating the lapse
of the waiting-period of a pregnant woman with the end of her pregnancy,
the rationale in this case is to make sure that the uterus of the woman is
free from any pregnancy before she can start a marital life with another
person. This rationale gets realized when the pregnancy comes to an end
whether the soul was breathed into the fetus or not (Ya¯s¯ın 1985, 104–05,
108).
As for the slippery slope argument or blocking the means to the evil
of abortion as advanced by the first position, advocates of this position
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came up with different counterarguments. The first counterargument is
that adopting the opinion that human life starts by breathing the soul does
not necessarily legitimize aborting the embryo before ensoulment. Shaykh
Umar al-Ashqar, who viewed that the embryo prior the soul-breathing
stage is to be considered dead from a religious perspective, was eager to
clarify this point. He said that it is true that some of the early religious
scholars legitimized aborting pregnancy before ensoulment because they
believed that it is dead. However, the main question here should not be,
does the fetus or the embryo before breathing the soul have human life or
not? The main question should be, does God allow any aggression against
pregnancy before ensoulment? Reviewing the relevant scriptural texts shows
that this aggression is prohibited and the one who does this should be fined
according to the precepts of Islamic law. Besides a number of Prophetic
traditions, al-Ashqar gave extensive quotations from the fatwas of a number
of well-known religious scholars such as al-Ghaza¯l¯ı (d. 1111), Ibn al-Jawzı¯
(d. 1201), and Ibn Taymiyya (d. 1328) in order to support his argument
(Ashqar 1985, 147–50). Second, some of the advocates of this position,
especially religious scholars, did not agree with the principle that abortion
is necessarily an evil that should be warded off and the means to which
should be blocked. On the contrary, abortion can sometimes be a source
of public benefit. This is the case, for instance, when you give individuals,
families, and nations a period during which they can get rid of undesired
pregnancies. In this way, many of the dangers that face future generations
can be challenged by aborting embryos before the breathing-soul stage. At
the end, the borderline between evil and benefit is to be drawn by the law
of God and not by the human intellect. So what God makes permissible
means that it has benefit and not evil as we might sometimes believe.
The Jordanian religious scholar Muh. ammad al-Ashqar wondered about
this and said, “We do not understand why some of our brothers from the
physicians’ group insist on being rigorous in this issue despite this clarity
and the flexibility shown byMuslim religious scholars” (Ashqar 1985, 128;
Ya¯s¯ın 1985, 105).
FINAL RECOMMENDATIONS AND FURTHER DEVELOPMENTS
One of the main characteristics of the collective Ijtiha¯d is that the
participants should come to a decision in the form of final recommen-
dations upon which there is unanimous agreement or should at least be
supported by the majority. After reading the papers and holding three
lengthy sessions for discussing the different viewpoints on the beginning
of human life, a committee of ten members was selected to draft the final
recommendations.
The drafting committee was equally divided between five religious
scholars: Abd Alla¯h al--Isa¯ (Kuwait), Kha¯lid al-Madhku¯r (Kuwait), Abd
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al-Satta¯r Abu¯ Ghudda (Syria), Yu¯suf al-Qarad. a¯wı¯ (born in Egypt and based
in Qatar), Muh. ammad Sulayma¯n al-Ashqar (Jordan), and five biomedical
scientists: Abd al-Rah.ma¯n al-Awad. ı¯ (Kuwait), H. assa¯n H. ath. u¯t (born in
Egypt and based in Kuwait and since 1988 settled in the United States),
Ah.mad al-Qa¯d. ı¯ (born in Egypt and based in the United States), Is.a¯m al-
Shirbı¯nı¯ (born in Egypt and based in Kuwait), and Ah.mad Raja¯’¯ı al-Jundı¯
(born in Egypt and based in Kuwait). Besides the balance between the
biomedical scientists and the religious scholars, there was also a balance,
although of a lesser degree, between the advocates of the twomain positions
discussed above. H. ath. u¯t and al-Qa¯d. ı¯ represented the first position, and
al--Isa¯, al-Qarad. a¯wı¯, al-Ashqar, and al-Shirbı¯nı¯ the second position. The
remaining members can be considered as neutral ones because they did not
express their inclination to any of the two positions during the deliberative
process. The text of the final recommendation reads:
The beginning of life occurs with the union of a sperm and an ovum, forming
a zygote which carries the full genetic code of the human race in general and of
the particular individual, who is different from all other beings throughout the
ages. The zygote begins a process of cleavage that yields a growing and developing
embryo, which progresses through the stages of gestation towards birth. Second:
From the moment a zygote settles (yastaqirr) inside a woman’s body, it deserves
a unanimously recognized degree of dignity (ih. tira¯m) and a number of religious
rulings, known to religious scholars, apply to it. Three: When the embryo reaches
the soul-breathing stage, the time of which is subject to controversy, being either
forty or 120 days, the fetus acquires greater sanctity (h. urma), as all scholars agree,
and additional religious rulings apply to it. Fourth: Among the most important
of these religious rulings are those with pertinence to abortion as pointed out
in article seven of the recommendations of the symposium on “Reproduction in
Islam.” (Madhku¯r et al. 1985, 676)
The committee had great difficulties in drafting these recommendations
and further difficulties in the final session in order to get them approved.
First of all, the recommendations crossed out different points because they
were too controversial and the text was confined to the points upon which
(semi-)consensus could be reached (Madhku¯r et al. 1985, 652). The text,
for instance, avoided any reference to the possible differentiation between
the beginning of life in the absolute sense and human life in particular,
which was very controversial among the participants in this symposium.
Further, the text of the recommendations was vague on three crucial points,
and each of them was the subject of heated debates among the advocates
of the previously mentioned two positions.
The first point was about using the intrauterine device (IUD) and if this
would be compatible with the first position that maintains that human
life starts by conception. During the deliberations of this symposium Dr.
T. alat al-Qas.abı¯ stressed that this point should be clarified in the final
recommendations because of its practical relevance to the medical practice
(Madhku¯r et al. 1985, 319). In the final session held for discussing the final
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recommendations, Shaykh al-Sala¯mı¯ noticed that the recommendations are
silent on this point, although it should be settled because of its significance
for the practicing physicians. Shaykh Abd al-Ba¯s.it. said that the available
text of the final recommendations suggests that it is permissible to use the
IUD because the fertilized ovum before being settled in the uterus has no
dignity. The chairman of the session, Dr. al-Awad. ı¯, thought it might be
necessary to get the available text revised by the drafting committee.H. ath. u¯t
did not approve the idea because he thinks that the drafting committee
cannot add any extra items in the final recommendations because the
opinions in the committee will be too divergent (Madhku¯r et al. 1985,
651–52). Other physicians such as Najm Abd Alla¯h insisted on appending
this point to the final recommendations. He said that we, as physicians,
need the standpoint of the religious scholars and they have to tell us: do
it or do not do it. Al-Qarad. a¯wı¯ assured Dr. Abd Alla¯h that the physicians
can prescribe the IUD as a contraceptive for their patients without feeling
any qualms because there is almost a unanimous agreement among the
participating religious scholars that the fertilized ovum has no sanctity
(h. urma) as long as it did not get settled in the uterus. The fertilized
ovum might have a dignity (ih. tira¯m), but this still does not mean sanctity
(Madhku¯r et al. 1985, 658–59). At the end, the text was not modified,
but the participants seemed satisfied with the interpretation given by the
religious scholars that permitted using the IUD on the basis of the available
text.
The second point was about abortion. It is generally recognized that
the viewpoint on abortion is highly influenced by and intertwined with
determining the beginning of human life (Beller and Zlatnik 1995,
477–83). Hence, one of the arguments advanced by advocates of the first
position in this symposium was to block the means to excessive abortions,
and the advocates of the second position also gave their counterarguments
on this point. At the very end of the symposium, Dr. Ah.mad al-Qa¯d. ı¯
objected to the text of the fourth recommendation. The first version
endorsed the relevant recommendation about abortion of the IOMS
symposium held in 1983. What is controversial in this recommendation,
al-Qa¯d. ı¯ argued, is the sentence that refers to the opinion advocated by
some of the participants that stated that abortion is permitted as long
as it is done before the lapse of 40 days of pregnancy, especially if
there is an excuse. Al-Qa¯d. ı¯ said that this contradicts what was agreed
upon here that the zygote enjoys dignity (ih. tira¯m) once it gets settled in
the woman’s body. “I do not call for revoking what was issued by the
symposium on human reproduction, but at least we should not refer to it,”
al-Qa¯d. ı¯ explained his request about taking the fourth recommendation
out from the final version of the text. Dr. Ah.mad Shawqı¯ Ibra¯hı¯m,
from the second position, objected to this proposal and said to al-
Qa¯d. ı¯. “Some of them [the zygotes] have no soul . . . have no soul. Be
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afraid of God!” The member of the drafting committee, Kha¯lid al-
Madhku¯r, also objected to this proposal and said that al-Qa¯d. ı¯ was himself
a member of the committee that drafted this text that took us more
than four hours. As a compromise, the chairman of the session, Dr.
al-Awad. ı¯, suggested reformulating the fourth recommendation, instead
of deleting it, in a way that might satisfy both parties (Madhku¯r
et al. 1985, 668–72). At the end, the fourth recommendation was
amended and the final version as quoted above made reference to the
1983 symposium without saying that this symposium adopts the same
standpoint.
Al-mı¯tha¯q al-Isla¯mı¯ al-a¯lamı¯ li al-akhla¯qiyya¯t al-t. ibbiyya wa al-s.ih. h. iyya
(The International Islamic Code for Medical and Health Ethics), drafted
by the IOMS in 2004, made two references to abortion. The first reference
stated that it is prohibited for the physician to abort a pregnant woman
unless abortion was necessitated by medical considerations that indicate
that woman’s health and life are in danger. However, the same text added,
abortion is permitted before the lapse of 4months of pregnancy if it is firmly
established that the progress of pregnancy endangers the mother’s life with
a serious harm and this should be confirmed by a medical committee of at
least three specialists (Jundı¯ 2005, 96–97). The second reference quoted
the relevant recommendations adopted by the 1983 and 1985 symposia.
Thus the controversial sentence adopted by a minority of the participants
in the 1983 symposium about the permissibility of abortion before 40 days
appeared again (Jundı¯ 2005, 348–49). It is clear that the first reference looks
muchmore restrictive than the second one, and the distinction made in the
first reference between abortions done before or after the lapse of 4 months
seems purely theoretical. In both cases, there should be a medical necessity
with pertinence to the mother’s life and the conditions for permitting
abortion before 4 months look even much stricter than those required to
permit abortion before the lapse of 4 months. This discrepancy between
the two references can be explained by understanding the first reference as
addressing the issue as far as it concerns the physicians whereas the second
reference qouted the IOMS recommendations which are usually meant
for common Muslims as well. Another possible explanation is that the
two references simply represent the diversity of opinions in contemporary
Islamic law on abortion.
EMBRYO RESEARCH
The third and final point was about using the surplus fertilized ova for
scientific research, which proved to be much more controversial than
the previous two issues. During the deliberations of this symposium, Dr.
Ma’mu¯n Ibra¯hı¯m commented on the disagreements between the advocates
of the aforementioned two positions by saying that he is not much
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interested in their theoretical debates on terminology and typology but
eager to find clear answers for two main questions. The first question reads:
“Are we allowed to kill the surplus fertilized ova or would we be sinful if
we did so?” The second question was about conducting scientific research
on these fertilized ova: “Is it permissible, from an Islamic perspective,
to use these fertilized ova in scientific research?” (Madhku¯r et al. 1985,
289–90). Shaykh Umar al-Ashqar, an advocate of the second position,
said that the advocates of the first position will surely answer the questions
of Dr. Ma’mu¯n by saying that both practices are categorically forbidden
because they believe that human life starts by fertilization. The advocates
of the second position, al-Ashqar added, might permit these practices
because they believe that human life starts much later, but they also might
forbid it, arguing that God did not permit these practices because of
other considerations irrelevant to determining the beginning of human
(Madhku¯r et al. 1985, 300–01). The two religious scholars, Abd Alla¯h
al--Isa¯ and Yu¯suf al-Qarad. a¯wı¯, opined that both practices are permissible
and they asked the two physicians H. ath. u¯t and al-Qa¯d. ı¯ to give up the idea
that human life starts by conception and show instead some flexibility.
Human life should at the earliest start when the fertilized ovum gets
settled in the uterus and not by conception. Otherwise, al--Isa¯ and al-Al-
Qarad. a¯wı¯ argued, it would be extremely difficult to give space for the two
practices proposed by Dr. Ma’mu¯n (Madhku¯r et al. 1985, 315, 318). Al-
Qa¯d. ı¯ responded positively to this request and finally expressed his support
to the contention that human life starts by the settlement of the fertilized
ovum in the uterus and not by conception (Madhku¯r et al. 1985, 324).
However, Dr. H. ath. u¯t remained firm in his opinion and argued that the
fertilizing ovum can grow even outside the uterus. He referred to the
experiments of an Italian scientist where the fertilized ovum could grow
up to the seventh week without being settled in the uterus (Madhku¯r et al.
1985, 307, 326).
Again the text of the final recommendations was silent on this point.
That is why the debates on these two questions continued in the final
session held for discussing these recommendations. The Kuwaiti physician
al-Unayzı¯ said that at least the case in the first question should be
permitted from an Islamic perspective because it falls within the realm
of necessity. In the in vitro fertilization (IVF) processes the physician
cannot but fertilize more than one ovum and there is no question about
the unavoidability of this situation. Thus, even if we equated killing these
fertilized ova with abortion, then it is an unavoidable abortion because the
other alternative would be to give these ova to other women, something
which is forbidden. So, al-Unayzı¯ concluded, we have nothing to do
in this case except getting rid of these surplus fertilized ova. Dr. Najm
Abd Alla¯h wished that the standpoint of al-Unayzı¯ would have been
one of the final recommendations because of its relevance to the medical
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practice of the physicians. In reference to the second question about using
the surplus fertilized ova for scientific experiments, al-Unayzı¯ stated that
Muslim religious scholars have not tackled this issue yet either individually
or collectively. However, the issue is very topical at the moment in Europe.
“I was amazed when I heard that even the Catholic theologians prohibited
this from a religious perspective,” al-Unayzı¯ wondered. If this symposium
wants to elaborate on this topic, al-Unayzı¯ proposed, we should either
give the religious scholars enough time to discuss this or we postpone it to
be studied in the future. The chairman of the session, Dr. al- al-Awad. ı¯,
and Dr. H. ath. u¯t supported the idea of scheduling this issue on the agenda
of the IOMS future activities (Madhku¯r et al. 1985, 657–58, 660). So,
the provisional conclusion of the symposium on this point was that the
proponents (including al-Al-Qarad. a¯wı¯, al-
-
Isa¯ and al-Qa¯d. ı¯) who permitted
one or both practices about which the questions were raised (including al-
Unayzı¯) outnumbered the opponents who were represented byDr. H. ath. u¯t
and Shaykh Umar al-Ashqar. However, the participants finally agreed that
the issue should be studied more profoundly in one of the future IOMS
symposia. This happened when the issue of the surplus fertilized ova was
raised in the IOMS symposium Al-ru’ya al-Isla¯miyya li bad. al-muma¯rasa¯t
al-t. ibbiyya (the Islamic vision of some medical practices) held in April
1987.
During the IOMS symposium of 1987, Dr. Ma’mu¯n Ibra¯hı¯m refor-
mulated the questions he raised in 1985 in a six-page paper entitled Al-
buwayd. a¯t al-za¯’ida an al-h. a¯ja: ma¯dha¯ nafal fı¯ha¯? (The Surplus Fertilized
Ova: What Should We Do with Them?). Ibra¯hı¯m argued that a clear
distinction should be made between these surplus fertilized ova on one
hand and the embryo that has already been implanted in the wall of
the uterus on the other hand. The fertilized ovum has just a partial life,
which is not different from the life attached to the male sperm and the
female nonfertilized ovum, and thus its dignity should be equal to their
dignity. Further, conducting this type of research, Ibra¯hı¯m concluded,
should be seen as a case of necessity. In reference to the IVF technology,
Ibra¯hı¯m said, “It is well known that had there been no continuous and
arduous scientific research in this field, it would have been impossible to
realize this great achievement, nor could we have succeeded in treating the
severe cases of infertility” (Ibra¯hı¯m 1995, 450–55). Besides Ibra¯hı¯m, Dr.
Abd Alla¯h Ba¯sala¯ma also submitted a paper on the same issue. Ba¯sala¯ma
also participated in the symposium of 1985, and he was an advocate of
the second position: human life starts by breathing the soul. In his paper
presented in 1985 Ba¯sala¯ma opined that the embryo gains sanctity (h. urma)
not by conception but just after 40 days of pregnancy (Ba¯sala¯ma 1985,
80). So, the expected conclusion would be that these surplus fertilized
ova have no sanctity. However, he did not give answers to the questions
raised by Dr. Ibra¯hı¯m in 1985. In his paper submitted to the symposium
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of 1987, Ba¯sala¯ma came up with a different conclusion: the embryo has
sanctity (h. urma) and any aggression against this embryo is forbidden,
and thus destroying the surplus embryos in the lab can be a punishable
offense in Islam. Ba¯sala¯ma concluded that the surplus embryos should be
implanted in the uterus of the mother again. Neither getting rid of these
embryos nor using them for research purposes is permissible (Ba¯sala¯ma
1995, 440–49). During the deliberative process, the religious scholars had
the opportunity to examine this issue from the perspective of Islamic
law. It is clear that the different opinions expressed by the participating
religious scholars were resonating with their standpoint about determining
the beginning of human life. The Egyptian H. asan al-Sha¯dhil¯ı and the
Tunisian Muh. ammad Mukhta¯r al-Sala¯mı¯ opined that human life starts by
conception and thus having surplus fertilized ova should always be avoided
and if they ever existed they should be implanted again in the uterus of
the mother. To them, it is not permissible either to kill them or to use
them for scientific research purposes. Dr. H. ath. u¯t remained holding fast to
what he contended in 1985 and thus expressed his support for al-Sha¯dhil¯ı
and al-Sala¯mı¯. He argued that surplus fertilized ova can in principle be
avoided but this will cost extra efforts, time, and money. However, these
extras are worth saving life in its first stage, H. ath. u¯t concluded. On the
other hand, the Egyptian Muh. ammad al-Ghaza¯l¯ı and the Syrian Abd al-
Satta¯r Abu¯ Ghudda gave their preference to making a distinction between
different stages of life. Abu¯ Ghudda specifically objected to what he called
“an exaggeration in ascribing sanctity to this fertilized ovum.” Dr. S. ala¯h. al-
At¯ıqı¯ supported the contention of al-Ghaza¯l¯ı and Abu¯Ghudda. Al-Ghaza¯l¯ı
opined that getting rid of these ova is permissible without commenting on
the possibility of using them for scientific research. Abu¯ Ghudda stressed
the difficulty to give a simple yes-no answer to these complicated questions.
He proposed that these questions should be examined more profoundly
by a committee of the religious scholars (Madhku¯r et al. 1995, 666–78).
Dr. Ma’mu¯n Ibra¯hı¯m was ultimately dissatisfied because he still did not get
clear answers to his questions. To him the text of the final recommendations
of the symposium held in 1985, which stated that human life gains dignity
only after the settlement of the fertilized ovum in the uterus, should
have been seen as guidelines for the religious scholars. Ibra¯hı¯m wondered
that there are, however, some religious scholars who reiterate that human
life starts by conception. Thus, a new run of discussions ensued where
outspoken support for the permissibility of using the surplus fertilized ova
for research purposes came up. For instance, the Mufti of Jordan Izz al-
Dı¯n al-Khat.ı¯b, Shaykh Abd al-Ba¯s.it. who expressed a similar opinion but
in less clear terms in 1985 and Shaykh Tawf¯ıq al-Wa¯¯ı stated that these
surplus ova have no sanctity (h. urma) (Madhku¯r et al. 1995, 724–34).
Different from the symposium of 1985, the final recommendations of the
1987 symposium referred explicitly to the surplus fertilized ova. The ideal
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situation, the text stated, is to have no surplus fertilized ova. If this was
unavoidable and there were surplus fertilized ova, then the majority of the
religious scholars stated that they have neither sanctity (h. urma) of any type
nor dignity (ih. tira¯m) before being implanted in the wall of the uterus.
Thus, the text continued, it is not prohibited to destroy these ova by any
means. The text also referred to the position of the minority among the
participants, which argued that these ova represent the first stage of the
human beingwhomGodhas dignified. Aboutwhat to dowith these surplus
ova, the text gave three options: namely, destroying them, using them for
scientific research purposes, or letting them die in a natural way. Finally,
the text gave preference to the third option by saying that it seems that it
is the least option that would violate sanctity (akhaffuha¯ h. urma) because
it does not involve direct aggression against life (Madhku¯r et al. 1995,
757). These recommendations represent an important breakthrough in this
issue compared to the symposium held in 1985. It is now on the IOMS
agenda as one of the main issues that deserve a profound examination
and thus a distinct reference has now been made to this issue in the final
recommendations. Using these surplus ova for scientific research purposes
was mentioned as one of the possible options although preference was
ultimately given to another option, namely letting them die in a natural
way. At any rate, the recommendations of the symposium held in 1987 still
did not say the final word and further meetings led to further developments
on this issue.
In October 1989, the IOMS organized a symposium where a special
section was dedicated to the aborted embryos as a possible source for
human organs. In this section, Dr. Ma’mu¯n Ibra¯hı¯m submitted a revised
version of his paper already read in 1987. The conclusion of the new version
was much bolder. Ibra¯hı¯m stated that such research must be encouraged
and promoted because of its medical benefits (Ibra¯hı¯m 1994, 193–200).
Dr. Abd Alla¯h Ba¯sala¯ma¯ also submitted a revised version of his paper read
in 1987 and also stuck to his contention that this type of research should
be prohibited from an Islamic perspective (Ba¯sala¯ma¯ 1994, 183–92). Dr.
H. ath. u¯t, one of the strong opponents to using the surplus fertilized ova
in scientific research, submitted a paper in which he reformulated the
opinion he already expressed in 1985 and 1987 (H. ath. u¯t 1994, 163–75).
The most important development in the symposium of 1989 was the
contribution of the three Jordanian religious scholars who submitted three
papers on this issue. In his extensive paper, Muh. ammad Na¯ım Yas¯ın
concluded that using these surplus ova for scientific research purposes is
in principle allowed in Islam (Yas¯ın 1994, 332–33). Abd al-Sala¯m al-
Abba¯dı¯ disagreed with Yas¯ın’s conclusion and opined that this type of
research should be forbidden (Abba¯dı¯ 1994, 389). Umar Sulayma¯n al-
Ashqar was satisfied with quoting the final recommendations adopted by
the IOMS symposium held in 1987 and commented upon by saying that
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the majority of the participants in this symposium permitted conducting
research on the surplus ova before and also after fertilization. Further, al-
Ashqar aptly remarked that restudying this issue will not unify the diverse
opinions because it is hardly possible to reach a unified opinion on such
complicated issues (Ashqar 1994, 395–96). The final recommendations of
this symposium adopted those of 1987 and quoted them literally but added
an important item “According to the opinion advocated by the majority
(which was not approved by some others) which permitted destroying the
fertilized ova by whatever means before their implantation in the uterus,
there is no barrier to conduct legitimate scientific experiments without
multiplying them. However, some objected totally to this” (Jundı¯ 1994,
648).
The same issue was discussed for the fourth time in a meeting organized
inMarch 1990 by the International Islamic Fiqh Academy (IIFA) affiliated
with the Organization of the Islamic Conference. The two papers of
Ibra¯hı¯m and Ba¯sala¯ma of 1989 were presented again, but neither Ibra¯hı¯m
nor Ba¯sala¯ma attended the meeting. In contrast to the previous symposia
where the participants were exclusively from a Sunnı¯ background, the
Iranian Shı¯¯ı religious scholar, Muh. ammad Al¯ı al-Taskhı¯r¯ı participated
in the IIFA meeting and expressed his support for the recommendations
adopted by the IOMS in 1987 (Majallat 1990, 2116). The resolution
adopted by the IIFA stated that if a surplus of fertilized ova became
unavoidable, then the only possible option is to let them die in a natural
way. Thus, destroying the ova and using them for scientific research were
both eliminated from the permissible options. The discrepancy between
the conclusion of the IOMS symposium held in October 1989 and that
of the IIFA meeting held in March 1990 was traced back to the influential
role of specific figures in the IIFA meeting who opposed the scientific use
of these surplus ova and simultaneously the absence of other important
figures who managed to defended the permissibility of this scientific use
in the IOMS symposium (Eich 2008, 69–72). We also add here another
possible reason, namely the centrality of sadd al-dhara¯’i (literally blocking
the means to evil and generally understood as the slippery slope argument)
in the deliberative process during the IIFA meeting. Almost all opponents
to the scientific use of the surplus fertilized ova spoke about blocking the
means to evil as a main argument. This was true to the extent that the other
voices expressed their worries about an exaggerative use of sadd al-dhara¯’i.
For instance, the Tunisian religious scholar al-T. ayyib Sala¯ma argued that
following this way of argumentation would eventually lead to adopting the
approach of the strict Christian interpretations. In reference to the other
principle in Islamic law, namely al-mas.a¯lih. al-mursala (public benefits),
the Kuwaiti religious scholar Muh. ammad Abd al-Ghaffa¯r al-Shar¯ıf also
argued that this excessive use of sadd al-dhara¯’i would harm the benefits
of the physicians (Majallat 1990, 2117–29).
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It is noteworthy that the resolution adopted by the IIFA in March 1990
was not perceived by the IOMS as a revocation of their own standpoints
endorsed in earlier symposia, but rather as parallel opinions each of which
has its own place and possible application within Islamic law. For instance,
the published proceedings of the IOMS symposium held in 1989 that
issued a permissive recommendation about using the surplus fertilized ova
for scientific research was appended by the resolutions adopted by the IIFA
meeting held in March 1990 (Jundı¯ 1994, 656–57). The same tradition
was also followed when the IOMS drafted the international Islamic code
for medical and health ethics by the end of 2004. The code referred to the
recommendations adopted by the IOMS in 1987 and 1989 besides the
resolution of the IIFA adopted in 1990 without giving preference to any of
these recommendations (Jundı¯ 2005, 387–90). These developments show
that practicing Ijtiha¯d on a collective level does not necessarily mean the
absence of the diversity of opinions in contemporary Islamic law.
The debate around the use of the surplus fertilized ova for scientific
research purposes witnessed a turning point when it was raised within the
context of stem cell research. Daniel Callahan has rightly said, “The aim
we have in mind in placing the question [when does human life begin?] in
the first place will have a bearing on the answer we consider appropriate”
(Callahan 1988, 29).Callahan’s statement is best applicable to this case. The
proposed scientific benefits of conducting stem cell research were crucial
in shifting the debate from sadd al-dhara¯’i (blocking the means to evil)
discourse that was dominant in the IIFAmeeting held in 1990 to al-mas.a¯lih.
al-mursala (public benefits) approach in the subsequent discussions. It
seems that the religious scholars became convinced that the benefits of stem
cell research outweigh the possible harms or means to evil that should be
blocked. The Islamic FiqhAcademy (IFA) affiliatedwith theMuslimWorld
League (MWL) issued a resolution on stem cell research in its seventeenth
session held in December 2003. The resolution reads, “It is permissible to
obtain, develop, and utilize the stem cells for medical treatment or lawful
scientific research if the source is also lawful.” The resolution gave five
examples of these lawful sources, and one of them was the surplus fertilized
ova in the IVF processes (Majallat 2004, 293–95). The same standpoint
was adopted by the IOMS during their international symposium held in
November 2007 under the title “Dilemma of Stem Cells: Research, Future
and Ethical Challenges.” The second item of the recommendations reads,
“Fertilized eggs surplus to the requirements of IVF possess no privileged
status and enjoy no sanctity before their implantation. It follows that there is
no objection to anymethod of disposing of them.Hence, using them for the
purposes of treatment and scientific research is better than wasting them”
(http://www.islamset.com/ioms/cairo2007/index.html). We see here an
important development because using the surplus fertilized ova for
scientific research is not seen just as one of the options as was the case
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in the IOMS symposia held in 1985 and in 1987. Now it is deemed as
the better option. To my mind, this shift in the debate has to do with the
new context in which this debate was rekindled by the beginning of the
twenty-first century, namely, the stem cell research.
Now a final word about the current relevance of the IOMS symposium
on human life held in 1985. The aforementioned developments are just
examples to show how seminal this symposium has been in the field
of Islamic bioethics. In 2000, the IOMS published a summary of this
symposium and in his foreword to this publication, the IOMS president
Dr. al-Awad. ı¯ stressed the up-to-date relevance of this symposiumby saying,
“Though 15 years have passed since this symposium was held, it is still
representing a clear concept of the academic methodology adopted by
the IOMS for studying such topics” (Jundı¯ 2000, 7). Also the topic “the
beginning of human life,” which was handled in the international Islamic
code for medical and health ethics issued by the IOMS in December 2004,
was solely based on the recommendations of this symposium (Jundı¯ 2005,
352–54).
THE INTERPLAY OF ISLAM AND THE WEST
The above-mentioned discussions have all to do with Islam and specifically
Islamic bioethics. However, the West and specifically the biomedical
achievements and the bioethical debates taking place in this part of the
world cannot be detached from these Islamic bioethical discussions. This
article argues that the interplay of Islam and the West was an important
dimension during the proceedings of the IOMS symposium held in 1985
and also the subsequent relevant events.
First of all, one of the main incentives of holding this symposium, as
outlined by the IOMS president Dr. al-Awad. ı¯, was to discuss the recent
scientific advancements achieved in Western countries from an Islamic
perspective. Further, al-Awad. ı¯ added, the symposium also aims to examine
the bioethical debates run by non-Islamic organizations (Madhku¯r et al.
1985, 18–19). Hence, holding this symposium to discuss the beginning
of human life should be understood within the context of contemporary
parallel debates among Western biomedical scientists and ethicists. The
Egyptian zoologist Abd al-H. a¯fiz. H. ilmı¯ made reference to such debates in
the United States, especially in 1981 and 1982. He argued, in agreement
with other participants in the symposium, that it would be enriching to
examine these debates not necessarily to follow suit but for the sake of
consultation (Madhku¯r et al. 1985, 260–61).
Further, the proceedings of the IOMS symposium held in 1985 and
the subsequent debates show that biomedical and bioethical arguments
developed in the West were integrated in the religious argumentation
between the religious scholars and the physicians who participated in the
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symposia held in the Muslim world. For instance, the advocates of the first
position who opined that human life starts from themoment of conception
made use of the slippery slope argument or sadd al-dhara¯’i as known in
Islamic law. They argued that those who say that human life starts at later
stages open the doors to evil, namely abortion. In order to prove the validity
of this argument, Shaykh al-Sala¯mı¯ appended his paper with a full Arabic
translation of an article published by the French newspaper Le Mond and
Dr. al-Qa¯d. ı¯ referred to the abortion statistics available in the United States
(Madhku¯r et al. 1985, 121–22, 298). Shaykh Muh. ammad al-Ashqar who
adopted a permissive standpoint toward abortion in the early stages of
pregnancy had to defend his standpoint against those who criticized his
approach ofWesternization (Madhku¯r et al. 1985, 128). Also when Shaykh
Umar al-Ashqar argued that the life of the embryo before breathing the
soul is not a human life but rather something compared to botanical life, he
supported his argument by quoting aWestern source. Al-Ashqar gave a long
quotation from the Arabic edition of The Evidence of God in an Expanding
Universe edited by John Clover Monsma (Ashqar 1985, 136–37). The
third example to be given here is Dr. Mukhta¯r al-Mahdı¯, who argued
that human life starts in the twelfth week. To defend this contention, al-
Mahdı¯ dedicated more than 95% of his paper to explaining the embryonic
developments, especially those with relevance to the nervous system and
specifically the brain. This information was based on 21 scientific studies,
the majority of which were published in the American Journal of Obstetrics
and Gynecology. However, al-Mahdı¯ tried to support his contention with
a specific metaphorical interpretation of the tradition of Ibn Masu¯d (see
the Appendix) in order to come to the conclusion of 12 weeks (Mahdı¯
1985, 62–73). During the deliberations, al-Mahdı¯ raised the question if
his interpretation might fit within the Islamic tradition. In response, al-
Qarad. a¯wı¯ said that no Muslim religious scholar has ever adopted such a
metaphorical interpretation (Madhku¯r et al. 1985, 312). Strikingly enough,
almost all Western countries use the twelfth week of pregnancy as the limit
for legal abortion (Beller and Zlatnik 1995, 478). So, it seems that al-
Mahdı¯ here was trying to integrate a Western standpoint into the Islamic
tradition.
Similar modes of the interplay of Islam and the West can also be traced
in the subsequent discussions relevant to the beginning of human life. For
instance, the IOMS symposium held in October 1989 examined the issue
of embryo research. Dr. H. ath. u¯t was a stern opponent to conducting this
type of research and warned that most of the embryos used for research are
aborted ones. In reference to the slippery slope (sad al-dhara¯’i) argument,
H. ath. u¯t said that means to this evil should be blocked and embryo research
should be declared as prohibited from an Islamic perspective. In order
to elaborate on the possible evils of such a research, he referred to an
embryo research scandal of an American research institute. According to
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H. ath. u¯t, this institute had a deal with an agent in a Southeast Asian country
who provided them with the embryos they need for research. Further,
experiments were conducted on living embryos during pregnancy because
the mothers already planned to have an abortion for one reason or another.
After abortion, the aborted embryos underwent surgical operationswithout
using anesthetics. The case went so far to the extent that a cosmetic
company used the living aborted embryos in order to examine the effect of
the chemical substances on the human complexion (Jundı¯ 1994, 172–73).2
In the same symposium,H. ath. u¯t referred to Germany, which banned all use
of human embryos in biomedical research. As for the surplus of fertilized
ova in the IVF processes, the law even banned initiating such a surplus. This
unique decision, H. ath. u¯t explained, had to do with Germany’s meticulous
sensitivity toward the dignity and sanctity of the human being because of
the infamous medical experiments conducted on the prisoners of war and
the detainees during the Nazi regime. H. ath. u¯t concluded that this law goes
in line with Islamic ethics (H. ath. u¯t 1994, 175). The publication of this
symposium was appended by the English text of the article “Germany to
Ban Embryo Research,” published by Science in August 1989 (Kirk 1989,
464; Jundı¯ 1994, 665). This German law had clear influence on the final
recommendations that stated that creating a surplus of fertilized ova during
IVF treatments should be avoided, and this is now technically available and
some European countries (West Germany) already do accordingly (Jundı¯
1994, 665). The influence of this law became more visible during the IIFA
meeting held in March 1990, which categorically forbade the creation of
surplus fertilized ova (Majallat 1990, 2155).
The interplay of Islam and the West in these gatherings held in the
Muslim world is not restricted to importing biomedical and bioethical
information from the West. Another dimension of this interplay is the
interest of these organizations such as the IOMS in conveying their message
to Muslims living in the West as religious minorities. The editorial of
the published volume on the symposium held in 1985 said about the
importance of studying the beginning and the end of life, “Examining these
two issues became an urgent necessity not only for the Muslim countries
but also for the Muslim minorities which have expanded and grown. They
are (1) eager to get clear answers about what is lawful and what is prohibited
in this respect and (2) some of them work in this field and are keen to
know the limits of their work” (Madhku¯r et al. 1985, 9–10). Translating
the whole voluminous work of this symposium into English might be seen
as a step in this regard so that the IOMS work can be accessible for a wider
audience among these minorities.3 The voice of the IOMS also finds its
way toMuslims living in theWest via Islamic organizations established and
functioning in the West. Just as an example we refer to the Islamic Medical
Association of North America (IMANA). It is noteworthy that some of
the prominent figures who regularly participated in the IOMS activities
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were also active in the IMANA such as H. assa¯n H. ath. u¯t and Ah.mad al-
Qa¯d. ı¯. Specifically about the beginning of human life, which was discussed
by the IOMS in its symposium held in 1985, an English translation of
the paper presented by the Jordanian religious scholar Muh. ammad Na¯ım
Yas¯ın was published in 1990 by the IMANA’s journal, The Journal of
Islamic Medical Association of North America (Yaseen 1990, 159–67). In
2005 When the IMANA formulated their position about the definition
of life, their position was echoing the recommendations of the IOMS
symposium, and they also made reference to the aforementioned paper
of Muh. ammad Na¯ım Yas¯ın (Athar and Hossam 2005, 36, 41). Further,
in personal communication with Dr. Abd al-Rah.ma¯n al-Awad. ı¯ and Dr.
Ah.mad al-Jundı¯, respectively, the president and the adjunct secretary of
the IOMS, I knew that they have different plans in order to intensify their
direct contacts with Muslims living in the West in the near future.4
CONCLUSIONS
The proceedings of the IOMS symposium held in 1985 represent one
of the early chapters in contemporary Islamic bioethics where both
religious scholars and biomedical scientists started to discuss bioethical
issues collectively. The proceedings of this symposium and its final recom-
mendations proved to be seminal on two levels: shaping the Islamic
standpoints on different bioethical issues and delineating the main
characteristics of contemporary independent legal reasoning on a collective
basis (Ijtiha¯d jama¯ı¯).
As for its relevance to contemporary Islamic bioethics, the symposium
showed that there was a great variety of opinions in the Islamic tradition
about the exact beginning of human life. These opinions were examined
and, when necessary, filtered at the hand of modern scientific knowledge.
By the end of the symposium, two main positions remained. The first
position saw that human life begins by conception and at the hand of
different debates the majority of the advocates of this position moved this
to a later moment, namely when the fertilized ovum gets settled in the wall
of the uterus. The second position opined that human life starts much
later, namely, when the soul gets breathed into the fetus and this takes
place at earliest after 40 days of pregnancy and at latest by the lapse of 4
months. The second position gained the support of the majority of the
participants, and this was also reflected in the final recommendations that
stated that life has three grades: it starts by conception, then gains dignity
(ih. tira¯m) by implantation, and finally acquires sanctity (h. urma) just after
breathing the soul.
The subsequent discussions among Muslim religious scholars and
physicians on different bioethical issues were always echoing the vision of
one of these two positions. Those who had restrictive standpoints toward
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abortion resonated with the vision of the first position, and the others
who adopted a permissive standpoint represented the second position. The
opponents to embryo research were influenced by the first position, and
those who advocated this type of research quoted the arguments of the
second position. The same holds true to the standpoints on many other
issues, including the use of an intrauterine device (IUD) and recently the
stem cell research, where the standpoint of the second position clearly had
the upper hand and thus got legitimized from an Islamic perspective. Also
in September 2004, when the Regional Office for the East Mediterranean,
World Health Organization (WHO) elaborated a position on human
cloning, the recommendations of the IOMS symposium were one of the
guidelines in this report when it discussed the issue of embryonic stem cell
research (Regional Committee 2004, 4).
This symposium also showed important developments in the field of
contemporary independent legal reasoning (Ijtiha¯d ). First of all, both
religious scholars and scientists agreed on the necessity of practicing Ijtiha¯d
collectively rather than individually in order to be able to tackle such
complicated bioethical issues. Second, the proceedings of this symposium
showed that the conclusions reached at the end of the Ijtiha¯d process are
not solely based on how to approach the scriptural texts or the opinions of
classical religious scholars. Modern scientific knowledge proved to be one
of the essential tools in this process and some classical interpretations and
contentions were crossed out because of their incompatibility with modern
science. We also have seen that Western bioethical and legal standpoints
started to get integrated into the Ijtiha¯d process. The aforementioned
German law on embryo research and the Western laws on abortion serve
as illuminating examples. Third, the participants in these discussions are
aware of the fact that their conclusions are based on human endeavor,
namely Ijtihad , and thus they do not represent a court of final appeal.
This gives space for diversity of opinions and also for further examination
and revision of these conclusions whenever relevant new biomedical or
bioethical developments take place.
NOTES
1. In English literature, it is also sometimes called Academy of Islamic Research or Islamic
Research Council.
2. I did my best to trace this embryo scandal in English sources but in vain. So, I do not
know to what extent the presentation of H. ath. u¯t to this incident is influenced by his anti–embryo
research standpoint.
3. The English version appeared in 1989 under the title Human Life: Its Inception and End
as Viewed by Islam. This article is based on the Arabic version because it is the original one.
Additionally, I noticed that the English version does not help elaborating on different technical
terms, which were essential in the discussions.
4. This was during theHonour Class For God’s Sake? Bio-medicine, Law and Religion organized
by Leiden University during the period May 25 to June 24, 2010, where Dr. al-Jundı¯ was one of
the invited lecturers.
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APPENDIX
• The Prophetic tradition reported by al-Bukha¯r¯ı and Muslim on
the authority of Ibn Masu¯d, referred to in the main text as the
tradition of Ibn Masu¯d.
ARABIC TEXT
ENGLISH TRANSLATION
“The creation of one of you is put together in his mother’s womb in
40 days, then he becomes a clot of congealed blood (alaqa) for a similar
period, then a little lump (mud. gha) for a similar period. Then Allah sends
an angel who is ordered to write four things. He is ordered to write down
his (i.e., the new creature’s) deeds, his livelihood, his (date of ) death, and
whether he will be blessed or wretched. Then the soul is breathed into
him.”
• The Prophetic tradition reported by Muslim on the authority of
H. udhayfa Ibn Usayd, referred to in the main text as the tradition
of H. udhayfa
ENGLISH TRANSLATION
When the fluid-drop (nut. fa) remains in the womb for 40 or 45 nights,
the angel comes and says: My Lord, will he be blessed or wretched? And
both these things would be written. Then the angel says: My Lord, would
he be male or female? And both these things would be written. And his
deeds and actions, his death, his livelihood; these are also recorded. Then
his document of destiny is rolled and there is neither addition to nor
subtraction from it.
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